1. Publication

Decisions and certain resolutions (if the Constitutional Court so chooses) are published in the Official State Gazette, local official gazettes and/or official gazettes of territorial units and in the official journal in which the respective general act had been published (in Slovenian).

2. The Effect of Publication

One day after the publication of decisions or on the expiry of the period specified by the Constitutional Court, abrogation decisions (ex nunc) come into effect. A general act abrogated (ex nunc) by the Constitutional Court does not apply to relationships that had arisen before the day such abrogation came into effect, if by that day such relationship had not been entered into.

Within three months from the day of the publication of the Constitutional Court decision, any affected person is entitled, based on a Constitutional Court decision, to request an amendment or retroactive abrogation (ex tunc) of an individual act or the elimination of detrimental consequences or even claim damages.

Comparative analysis shows that different countries display interesting features of constitutional judicial proceedings. E.g., in Austria on October 3, 1946, the Constitutional Court approved the standing orders of its activities, which stays in effect and unmodified since.

In the Constitutional Court the parties may give up taking part in the hearing, which on no account will prevent the court from making a decision.

To effect normal judicial process and maintain the authority of the Constitutional Court, the Chair has the right to apply an administrative fine to the amount of 500-1500 shillings and (or) a detention of 3-9 days. A stricter sanction is used for using insulting words, deliberate dragging of time, giving false testimony. In the course of case examination a recusation or self-recusation of a member of the Court is not authorized by law. However, the Court at a closed hearing can make a decision to ban a participation of a Court member in a specific case if he had a direct association with the particular case. The decisions of the Constitutional Court enter into force in an established order since the day of the official publication. Meanwhile, for the inept legal acts the Court is competent to establish new terms.

It is also to be noted that the Austrian Constitutional Court compiles generalized information annually submitting it to the Federal Chancellor. It also contains findings and suggestions related to the administration of constitutional review.

In Germany the Federal Constitutional Court operates on the basis of the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court Act adopted in 1951 (with subsequent amendments, 1969 and 1993 in particular, and its standing orders (adopted in 1986 and amended in 1989, 1995). The Court's operation is continuous. One chamber is run by the Court Chair, the other chamber by his deputy. Decisions are commonly taken by the majority vote. If the votes are tied equally (with a 4:4 correlation in chambers), the case examination is terminated.

It is important to underscore that the case examination is mainly done in a written form. The Court also has the right to hold an oral hearing, if no objections by the parties. No oral examination can be demanded if the case is based on an individual complaint. Cases of this type are examined in the written form. Incidentally, individual complaints can be submitted within 1 month after making the judicial decision or another disputed act. When appealing the law, this term extends to 1 year. As established by the Law, an individual complaint can be submitted to the Constitutional Court only if all other means of judicial decision have been exhausted. It is also required by Law that the parties be represented by counsel.

To be noted are certain features of constitutional judicial proceedings in Portugal. In particular, reporters on the case are chosen by lot and have to submit a draft decision. When making the decision, provided the votes tied, the Chair has a tie-breaking vote. Decisions on issues of abstract review are made at plenary sessions of the Court, and on issues of concrete review the case examination and decision making is done by the chambers (with 6 members each). It is also provided that the Chair can transfer an examination of some concrete case to a plenary session. The parties in the court are represented by counsel, case examination is in the written form, open hearings are not organized. Present in the Court are 2 permanent representatives of the prosecutor's office. If on concrete cases a particular legal norm is thrice recognized as unconstitutional, the prosecutor's representatives in the Court can initiate a procedure of abstract review. In this case, the Court decision has a universal character, so that the particular regulation becomes invalid. The Court in this country has the right to autonomously determine the terms of putting its decision into operation.

In many countries the law clarifies the characteristics of constitutional judicial proceedings on individual categories of cases. For example, Chapter 9 of the RA Constitutional Court Act is dedicated to this issue (THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A CASE UNDER REVIEW AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT), moreover, Articles 55 -57 of this Act state: "Article 55: Consideration of a case on the conformity of laws, resolutions of the National Assembly, decrees and orders signed by the President of the Republic, and Government resolutions with the Constitution.

With regard to issues determined by Point 1 of Article 100 of the Constitution, the following may appeal to the Court:

1) the President of the Republic;
2) at least one-third of the Members of the National Assembly.

The Constitutional Court may adopt one of the following decisions on the case:

1) recognize the obligations deriving from the international agreement as being in conformity with the Constitution;
2) recognize the obligations deriving from the international agreement in whole or in parts as not in conformity with the Constitution.

Article 57: Consideration of disputes relating to the results of referenda, the results of the election of a President and deputies.

With regard to issues determined by Point 3 of Article 100 of the Constitution, the following may appeal to the Constitutional Court:

To some degree, those features, in accordance with different powers of the Court, are registered in the law. Meanwhile, we maintain a viewpoint that the regulation of those features should be left to the discretion of the Court.

With regard to the dissenting opinion in constitutional proceedings and to its evaluation as a completely positive phenomenon, there is a parallel awareness that the institute of dissent conceals a potential danger, since the members of the Constitutional Court can be prone to political populism. This system is particularly dangerous when making decisions on electoral disputes as well as in minor systems in a transitional period. The latter is because on one hand, the society is overly politicized, on the other hand, nearly all active members of society in smaller countries have some knowledge of one another. Therefore, the role of collegial, non-individualized decisions and approaches is very great.

One of the substantial features of the constitutional judicial proceedings stipulated by the time factors is in limitations sanctioned in different countries, often unjustified. For example, part 1, Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia reads:

"The Constitutional Court shall render its decisions and findings not later than within thirty days after a case has been filed". However, the worldwide practice rejects such limitations giving the Court a certain freedom.

Also important is the right of the Court to determine the terms of validation for their decisions. A typical example is the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland. Article 190 of this country's Constitution reads: "3. A judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal shall take effect from the day of its publication, however, the Constitutional Tribunal may specify another date for the end of the binding force of a normative act. Such time period may not exceed 18 months in relation to a statute or 12 months in relation to any other normative act. Where a judgment has financial consequences not provided for in the Budget, the Constitutional Tribunal shall specify date for the end of the binding force of the normative act concerned, after seeking the opinion of the Council of Ministers.

4. A judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on the non-conformity to the Constitution, an international agreement or statute, of a normative act on the basis of which a legally effective judgment of a court, a final administrative decision or settlement of other matters was issued, shall be a basis for re-opening proceedings, or for quashing the decision or other settlement in a manner and on principles specified in provisions applicable to the particular proceedings".

This approach seems to be justified, causing the constitutional review to be most efficient. We consider as irrelevant to the institute of constitutional review making the decisions obliging the bodies of executive or other authorities to carry out certain actions or those containing binding mandates²³⁴.

The type of decisions of the bodies of constitutional review mainly stipulates their role and position within the system of state authority, and the potential ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution. The legal type of the Constitutional Court decisions is very clearly defined in literature. This is a legal act recognized by the court within its competence and in the procedural order established by the law, the contents of which act is a statement of certain legal facts and presentation of state-power rulings mandatory for the parties to the constitutional legal relations²³⁵.

Without touching upon the procedural features and types of decisions by the constitutional courts, or requirements to the particular decisions, we deem it necessary to focus upon the problem of the legal validity of the Constitutional Court decisions.

The Constitutional Court decisions are as a rule binding for implementation, final and are not subject to review. However, in some countries the Parliament can review a Constitutional Court decision adopted within the framework of the preliminary review (Namibia, Romania, Ecuador, Ethiopia). The legislator can nullify the decision of the body of constitutional review by 2/3 of the votes. A similar right of veto is enjoyed by the Parliaments of Romania, Mongolia, the President of Kazakhstan (in Mongolia, if the Great State Khural nullifies the decision, the Court will re-examine the case to carry out the final decision (Art. 66 of the Constitution), white in Kazakhstan a presidential veto is overruled by 2/3 of the votes).

The mandatory decisions can in turn be of two kinds: one - having a universal (regulatory) character and mandatory for all, two - having a relative effect concerning only the subjects of law associated with a particular case.

From a scientific viewpoint the legal text focuses upon law making in the sphere of constitutional review, upon types and legal nature of the acts by the constitutional courts²³⁶. Special attention is devoted to the statements where the acts by Constitutional Courts have a universally mandatory nature, become the source of law, in most cases (particularly when interpreting the constitutional provisions) have more legal force than the acts by legislative bodies.

We think that it should be particularly noted that a Constitutional Court decision is to re-establish disrupted constitutional balance rather than result in new disruptions of this balance. With regard to the importance and deficient knowledge of this aspect, it seems expedient to identify the effect of the Constitutional Court decisions. This can be elucidated by three examples. One: the formulation of Andrash Shayo, provided with regard to the decisions by the Constitutional Court of Hungary on the socio-economic rights. The formulation is as follows:

"The socio-economic rights + Constitutional Court = a relapse of the state-controlled socialism"²³⁷. The meaning of this question is that in the New Independent States, a new tint and a special significance are Attached to he decisions of a body which takes final decisions not subject to review. In this case, following the strict letter of the law (incidentally also the law whose provisions are already contradictory to the new philosophy and logic of reforms and remains unmodified often for technical reasons), prompted indirectly is the approach that basically contradicts the process of transformation of public relations and with the type of constitutionally registered new relations. This problem unfortunately has not been sufficiently studied or properly reflected in the new NIS laws on bodies of constitutional review. This type of situation can frequently result in extreme and misplaced decisions. E.g., a draft new Constitution of Hungary provided an outcome of this situation by abolishing the right of the citizens to directly appeal to the Constitutional Court. The Venice Committee of The Council of Europe expressed its attitude to this type of approach at the meeting of March 7, 1997: this step has been perceived as an inadmissible and serious retreat from the democratic elements of implementing constitutional review.

It would be good to show another example. It is concerned with the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of February 18, 1997 on the constitutionality of government decision # 197 of February 18, 1995. The matter is that the Constitutional Court, aware that the government decision contains unconstitutional regulations, was also sure that an immediate suspension of this decision (relevant to the expected changes in the revenue section of the budget) will in turn create an unconstitutional situation. The Constitutional Court can see the way out in that the government decision is recognized as invalid 6 months after the validation of the Constitutional Court decision. This type of decision can perhaps be regarded as compromising and typical for a transitional period. No doubt that the right to making this decision is authorized by the Constitutional Court Act. However, note here is to be taken of another thing. The Constitutional Courts have to willingly or unwillingly dedicate the necessary efforts to the possible aftermath of their decisions and their direct or indirect effect upon the social processes²³⁸.

The third example is related to Armenia. We have already noted that the effect of Constitutional Court decisions upon the social processes are of major importance. It is very essential that the people believe in objective and unbiased judgment of the constitutional review, which can mainly be ensured through the functional efficiency and principled behavior of the Constitutional Court. However, there are many other unfortunate factors playing a certain role in forming the public opinion. Problems of this type frequently emerge when examining the disputes on electoral results. The Constitutional Court, as a rule, has not competence to examine the factual circumstances of those cases (e.g., see the Republic of Armenia Constftutional Court Act, Art. 57). In similar situations the Constitutional Court should proceed from the decisions of ordinary courts, to determine the effect of electoral fraud upon the general electoral results. And what if through different reasons the relevant persons have not appealed to the ordinary courts, so that the objective decisions of those courts do not exist? In that case, some part of society will certainly retain a mistrust to the overall decisions on electoral disputes.

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia found itself just in this type of situation when examining the case on disputing the results of the Republic of Armenia presidential election that had taken place on September 22, 1996.

It is to be noted that 930 communal and 11 regional electoral commissions had been organized and acting to monitor the course of preparation holding and summarizing the election on the territory of the Republic, following the Republic of Armenia Election of the President of the Republic Act. The entire electoral process had been organized and controlled by the Central Electoral Commission, the membership of which had been confirmed by the decision #190 of the Government of the Republic of Armenia, as established by the Law, on June 25, 1996. 100 representatives of the Council of the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of CIS with a status of observers, EU offices of democratic laws and human rights, as well as the observers representing the Parliament of Georgia took part in the process of preparation, implementation and generalization of the results of Presidential election by the invitation of the Central Electoral Commission. They were afforded the opportunity to perform the functions of foreign observers during the elections, provided by Articles 7, 26, 29, 30 of the Republic of Armenia Election of the President of the Republic Act.

The Central Electoral Commission, summarizing the electoral results, adopted a resolution on September 29, 1996 by the majority vote (16 v. 2) on the election of Levon Ter-Petrossian as President of the Republic. Vazgen Manukian, candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, in his appeal submitted to the Constitutional Court on October 24, 1996, qualified this resolution as unacceptable. The appealing party determined that during the preparation and implementation of election the universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret voting had been violated, which had a direct effect on the electoral results.

The appealing party explained the existence of such violations, mentioned in the documents submitted by them, on the ground of inconsistency of numerical data in protocols of electoral commissions with officially published results, on the ground of artificial increase of percentage of voters' participation in voting at individual precincts, written explanations of witnesses, as well as the facts registered by foreign observers.

Also taken as a base were arguments given in the final statement of the EC supervisory mission of October 16, 1996.

The respondent on the case, the Central Electoral Commission, objected to the appellants, stating that there was no case for nullifying the election, inasmuch as the Central Electoral Commission summarized the electoral results according to Article 31 of the Republic of Armenia Election of the President of the Republic Act on the basis of summary data of the regional voting results, while the appellant-stated fraud can be considered as proved only with reference to the relevant decision of a higher-ranking electoral commission or courts of general jurisdiction. However, the appellants, as a rule, have never appealed to those bodies, and this type of court decisions are non-existent.

References were obtained from the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia that the courts of general jurisdiction had received no appeals on the presidential election.

The presidential candidate submitted the documents of the following type: firstly, separate opinions of the proxies and members of commissions, protocols and other legends, secondly, references and analyses prepared on their basis by appellant's representatives, thirdly, copies of summary protocols of electoral commissions. The first group of documents reflecting the basic arguments of the appellant party on their reported wrongdoing at individual electoral districts and commissions, was signed by about three percentage of persons taking part in the preparation, carriage and monitoring of the election on behalf of the party disputing the electoral results.

Examination of those documents has shown that they largely consisted of assumptions, impressions, unverified rumors.

About 14 percent complaints cited in the mentioned documents dealt with summarizing the electoral results, with the rest reflecting the preparation and carriage of the election.

In order to verify the arguments cited by using the individual precincts as examples, and to examine the facts referred to in the statement of the EC supervisory mission, the Constitutional Court has organized a special investigation of all the documents from 162 electoral precincts. Included into those precincts were mainly the electoral precincts to be inspected as specified by the appellant party.

Those huge and strained efforts, irrelevant to some degree to the Constitutional Court and resulting in a vigorous rejection of the appellant's arguments, as a whole, failed, however, to satisfy the expectations of the public.

Moreover, comparison of summary protocols of 1035 electoral commissions acquired by the proxies of the presidential candidates and submitted to the Constitutional Court, with the official voting data at the same precincts, has shown that partial inconsistencies had taken place at 9 precincts only.

The Constitutional Court has remarked that in the course of preparation and carriage of the election as well as in summarizing the electoral results, the presidential candidates and their proxies did not make a full use of all the opportunities afforded by law to resolve the arising disputes.

Thus, the Republic of Armenia Election of the President of the Republic Act (Articles 9, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 21, 30) allows to appeal the decisions and actions of the electoral commissions, and demands the electoral commissions to review and to nullify the illegal decisions and actions of the inferior electoral commissions. Article 13 of the Act that is completely dedicated to the procedure of appealing the decisions and actions of the electoral commissions, provides that the decisions and actions of electoral commissions can be appealed to the superior electoral commissions or court, while the decisions on summarizing the electoral results and the counting of stubs can be appealed to the superior district and Central Electoral Commissions. The decisions (except the decisions on electoral results) and actions of the Central electoral commission can be appealed to the Supreme Court.

Despite the existing procedure of this type for examining the complaints, the evidence acquired during the Constitutional Court inquiry showed that the competent persons of the appellant parties have nearly failed to implement their rights provided by the law on this issue.

As also noted by the Constitutional Court, despite the evident improvement of the electoral legislation, the organization, implementation and summarizing of the electoral results have been adversely affected by the flaws and lapses in the Election of the President of the Republic Act and the Elections to the Bodies of Local Self-Govemment Act.

The Constitutional Court stated that the procedure for recruitment of the electoral commission by the principle of party representation registered in Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Republic of Armenia Election of the Bodies of Local Self-Govemment Act was unjustified.

The issues of organizing the voting of the military, and the verification of voting results, evaluation of the inaccuracy of voting results were resolved insufficiently or incompletely. The procedure of summarizing the voting results and compiling the protocols needed more simplicity and verification.

The Constitutional Court has also stated that summarizing the September 22, 1996 presidential election results in the Republic of Armenia by the Central Electoral Commission had been effected pursuant to the powers established by Law.

Having examined the summary protocol of the Central Electoral Commission, the Constitutional Court found that there was full accord between the summary data of the district electoral commission and the summary protocol of the Central Electoral Commission, as well as between the different indications of the latter. This showed that in the Central Electoral Commission there had been no misrepresentation of the presidential election results, and the data of electoral commissions on electoral results had been accurately summarized.

Meanwhile, with regard to the registered extensive numerical disagreement between the number ot voters and the available stubs and ballots, particularly in Yerevan City, the Constitutional Court compared the data of summary protocol of all 303 precinct commissions and 12 communal commissions of Yerevan City. It has been found out that there had been a number of inaccuracies and inconsistencies.

To verify the valid summary of presidential election results done by the district electoral commissions, the Constitutional Court examined the data on electoral results summarised in the communities, as published by the "Hayastani Hanrapetutiun" tabloid on October 22, 1996, and examined the complete information presented by the Central Electoral Commission at the Court's demand.

In those cases, the correlation of votes cast for the presidential candidates, was also in correspondence to the summary data of the Central Electoral Commission. When evaluating the effect of the divergence in the number of ballots and stubs in the ballot boxes or the number of voters and stubs or ballots upon the votes cast for the candidates, as well as with regard to the disagreements of the protocol data, it has been found out that in this case, too, the votes cast for the candidate elected President of the Republic by the decision of the Central Electoral Commission, amounted to over one half of all the votes cast for the candidates. On this basis, the case was dismissed.

However, if from the legal viewpoint the decision by the Constitutional Court within the existing competence has passed a serious test successfully, the problem as a whole remained unresolved to some degree. The matter is that anyway, under the acting legislation, electoral system and public attitude to the judicial system of general jurisdiction, many issues remained outside the competence of the Constitutional Court.

The experience of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia shows that of great importance in organizing and carrying out the election is to provide a systemic approach in combining and implementing the competencies of all entities and institutes engaged in the electoral process. As to the body of the judicial constitutional review, it has to possess the competence or to implement a complete control over the electoral process (as implemented by the Constitutional Council of France), or else it has to restrict itself to establishing the constitutionality of the decisions by the Central Electoral Commission. This type of approach was also agreed upon by the participants of the Third Yerevan International Seminar on the subject "Constitutional Review and the Electoral Process" held in October 1998.

Currently going on in the international practice is an effort to help the constitutional courts of NIS in the process of their substantiation, to facilitate the elaboration of correct solutions to the problems of the transitional period. A huge experience has been gathered by the Venice Commission of the European Council, organizing seminars in different countries, dedicated to the basic issues of constitutional review, expert revision of laws and draft laws, problem discussions, etc. However, there was a non-standard ruling adopted by the Commission at its meeting of March 7, 1997. It was on the issue of the Constitutional Court of Croatia. The ruling basically stated that the European Council from the 3 candidates presented by the Constitutional Court of Croatia and 3 more candidates from the Venice Commission selected two persons to be appointed observers in the Constitutional Court of Croatia. The observers have the right to express their opinion prior to decision taking, and following the decision taking, to submit their separate written opinion. Without dwelling upon details, particularly on this approach being very ambiguous, it is to be noted that in emergencies, when resolving the problems of system reformation, the constitutional review is becoming more significant, its decisions become crucial, and require therefore a careful and weighted approach.

There is an often-expressed opinion that for the transitional period the constitutional regulations have to be of a temporary nature, not to restrict the implementation of active reforms, particularly in the realm of economics²³⁹. Naturally, situations of this type make the missions of the constitutional courts more difficult and lend the new tinges to the old-time dispute: what is to be favored: the letter or the spirit of the Constitution.

We think that the need to ensure a relatively free activity of the constitutional courts and to delegate them the competence to directly interpret the Constitution is becoming a priority. However, in the particular case it is necessary to exclude the possibility of a case inquiry by the Court on its own initiative on some issue and of taking a decision. There must be a principle of self-restriction. Otherwise, a statement of the French legal scholar Lecharier is completely justified that the Constitutional Council is the funniest page of the French constitutional law. Even the most conservative psychotics could never devise the power of veto, so as to put it at the disposal of nine gentlemen responsible to no one and appointed arbitrarily by virtue of a courteous favoritism²⁴⁰. We think that there is no need to fall into an extremity, it should not be disregarded that even in relation to law making the constitutional review can be regarded only as a means of ensuring democracy.

In the practice of constitutional review the issue of adjusting the time limits of the Court decision is of great significance. As has been noted, Part 1, Art. 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia contains an unambiguous provision: "The Constitutional Court shall render its decisions and findings not later than thirty days after a case has been filed". Acting within the same frame is also the Constitutional Council of France.

The reason, however that it is possible in France is that the review is mainly done in the written form, the judicial procedure is not competitive, the decision is made by hearing the case at a closed-door session. In all countries where the decision is taken with the parties engaged in an oral judicial proceedings, as a rule, rigid limitations of terms are not established. There have also been extreme cases, when, e.g., the US Supreme Court made a decision only several years after the hearings. The prevailing, and, perhaps, most acceptable is the approach when the Constitutional Court is given some autonomy in deciding upon the term of decision making. In these cases the practical average term is 5 - 6 months. That is testified by the experience of Italy, Germany, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and a number of other countries.

It is also important to show a differentiated approach when exercising different types of powers. E.g., Armenia is one of the few countries where the Constitutional Court is competent to resolve disputes the results of parliamentary elections (Art. 100, item 3 of the RA Constitution). Meanwhile, the Court has to pass a decision at an open-door session in full membership (with an insured quorum) within 30 days. It is theoretically not excluded that after the forthcoming parliamentary elections the Constitutional Court will simultaneously hear a large number of appeals from parliamentary candidates. A deadlock is necessarily developed, otherwise the court is bound to show a purely formal approach that would affect its image. Those are the issues awaiting further adjustments.

Particular features are characteristic of the procedure for adopting acts by specialized bodies of constitutional review, and to their legal aftermath in different countries. We shall dwell here on the distinctive and noteworthy features. Eg., in Austria the Court selects permanent speakers from among its members for 3 years, who, on errand from the Chair, prepare the cases for examination. Decisions are commonly adopted by majority vote, the chair having no tie-breaking force. It is to be noted that although the Court has a single chamber and the decisions are taken by the full membership, certain issues can be examined at sessions involving 4 judges. This approach could be fully acceptable in Armenia when resolving disputable issues concerning the parliamentary elections.

In Germany the Federal Constitutional Court is in continuous operation. The work of one chamber is guided by the Chair of the Court, the other one by the Deputy Chair. Decisions are commonly adopted by majority vote. If votes are divided equally (in relation 4:4 in the Chambers), the hearing of the case is suspended.

Also of interest is the type of decisions taken by the Federal Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court can recognize a legal regulation as invalid, this decision having retroactive effect. Meanwhile, the Court can rule that a legal regulation does not conform to the Basic Law, however, in that case, too, this regulation remains in effect until it is reviewed by the legislator. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court can establish a term of time for the review (paragraphs 31 and 79 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act). The Constitutional Court can also declare null and void the decision by an ordinary court and appeal the case to another court (as a rule, the Constitutional Court does not issue decisions on cases under the jurisdiction of the general courts).

Pursuant to Art. 75 of the country's Constitution, as well as with regard to the precedents (in particular, that is relevant to the decision #16 adopted in 1976), the Constitutional Court of Italy can resolve the issue on holding a referendum on banning certain regulations (it is to be noted that the bodies of constitutional review in some countries, like the Constitutional Council of France, consider themselves incompetent to examine issues related to holding the referenda).

In France the term of decision taking is one month (on demand by the Government it can be reduced to 8 days). The Council takes decisions at the required quorum of 7 of its members. A decision is made following the results of written examination, with the sides taking part, and with no provisions for dissenting opinion or publishing the discussion and voting results.

In the countries providing the right of a Constitutional Court member for a dissenting opinion, the dissenting opinion is published along with the decision.

In Spain, the Constitutional Court is authorized to defer issuing the decision (both at plenary sessions and at sessions of chambers), to commit the submission of additional arguments, having suspended for this period the validity of the regulation in question (up to 6 months). The decisions with regard to the constitutionality of the regulations issued on specific cases also have binding and universal character.

In Turkey, the Constitutional Court is bound to issue a decision on the case, to be published not later than 5 months following the filing. If the appeal had been received from an ordinary court, with no decision taken within that period, the court of first instance has to complete the case pursuant to the legislation. However, if the Constitutional Court has carried a final decision on the case, the court of first instance is bound to comply. A recurrent appeal with regard to the same provision of the law is unqualified until a period of 10 years has elapsed since the day of the official publication of the Constitutional Court decision on the rejection of the first appeal. Art. 153 of the country's Constitution determines the character of the decisions by the Constitutional Court and the procedure of their publication. There is a provision that the decisions of the Constitutional Court are final. The decisions qualifying a legal act as not valid cannot be published without supporting argumentation. When hearing the cases on nullifying the laws, decrees having the force of laws or their individual provisions, the Constitutional Court cannot assume the role of a law maker, nor can it use its decision to lend new application to the disputed act. The Law, regulatory acts having the force of law, decrees or Rules of procedure of the Grand National Assembly or their individual provisions are suspended and recognized as invalid since the date of the publication of the decision by the Constitutional Court. If needed, the Constitutional Court can also establish the term of its decision coming into effect. This term cannot exceed one year since the date of the official publication of the decision. The decisions of the Constitutional Court have to be published immediately, printed in an official newspaper, they are mandatory for the legislative, executive and judicial bodies, officials, citizens and their associations.

As a feature of the Court's activities, perhaps, it is also to be indicated that in case of an abstract review of the constitutionality of regulatory acts an appeal can be made only within 60 days after the publication of the act.

As has been noted, in contrast to many other countries, in Romania, a decision by the Constitutional Court on constitutionality of laws and parliamentary rulings is not final. It can be accepted for examination by the Parliament. In case of a confirmation of a legal act by 2/3 votes in both chambers, the Court is no more competent to re-examine the constitutionality of the given act. There is one exception: the decision by the Constitutional Court on the standing orders of the Houses is final. In this case, the Parliament has no competence to examine the Court's decision. A similar question emerged in 1994, when co-chairs of both chambers appealed to the Constitutional Court separately on the constitutionality of the Chambers' standing orders. In both cases the Court ruled that they contained unconstitutional regulations (25 of the 213 standing orders provisions of the Chamber of Deputies, and 29 of 184 standing orders provisions of the Senate), so that the Parliament had to bring the acts into conformity with the Constitution.

In the Russian Federation the Constitutional Court Act clearly defines (Art. 79), that the decisions of the Constitutional Court are validated at the moment bf their publication in the Court. As is noted, a procedure has been practically established, when the Constitutional Court of Russia often determines the procedure of implementing its decisions, or delegates to relevant bodies to implement a specific action within their competence. This mode of action is also applied with regard to the Parliament (the requirement to make the relevant amendment of the law or produce a legislative decision). This type of approach is not supported by many legal experts, since the Court is allegedly taking upon itself the legislative functions.

One of the principal conditions of the effectiveness and coherence of decisions taken by the Constitutional Court is to respect the requirements of international legal acts. A good example in this issue is the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, which, when developing its legal references, often leans upon the international covenants on economic, social and ethnic rights, as well as upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights²⁴¹. A similar approach is also widely practiced by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia.