2. See: Витрук Н.В. Koнcmumуцuoнnoe npaвоcyдue. M., 1998, c. 8 -9.

3. See, in particular, Алексеев С. С. Философия права. M., c. 16-20, 112-115, 219-239; Нерсесянц В. С. Философия права. M., 1997, c. 92-107; Ibid., Право и закон. M., 1983; Кудрявцев В. Н. О правопонимании и законности. Государство и право. 1994. N 3, c.7.

4. See: Овсепян Ж. И. Судебный конституционный контроль в зарубежных странах. Ростов-на-Дону, 1992, c. 42. Шульженко Ю. Л. Конституционный контроль в России. М., 1995, c. 9.

5. "Конституционный контроль и демократические преобразования в новых независимых государствах". An International Seminar, Collection of Materials. Yerevan, Oct. 16 - 18, 1996, p. 223.

6. Cf. Rousseau Dominique, La justice constitutionnelle en Europe, Montchrestien, Paris, 1996, pp. 1-10; Favoreu Luis, Los tribunales constitucionales, Editorila Ariel, S. A., Barcelona, 1994, p. 15 et al. and p. 137 et al.; Fromont Michel, La justice constitutionnelle dans le monde, Dalloz, Paris, 1996, p. 5-38.

7. Capeletti, M., The Judicial Process in Perspective, Chapt. 3, published in 58 Cal. L. Rev. 1017(1970), published also in Beatty D., Comparative Constitutional Low, Faculty of low, University of Toronto, Spring 1994, p. I-6.

8. See: Laurence H. Tride. American Constitutional Law. New York, 1988, p. 23-42; Constitutional Law, Cases - Comments - Questions. West Publishing Co., 1996, p. 1-57; Christopher Wolfe. The Rise of Modern Judicial Review, 1994.

9. John E. Novak, Ronald D. Rotunda. Constitutional Law. Fifth edition, West Publishing Co. 1995, p. 4.

10. See details: Sulvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution. Yale University Press, 1990, p. 408-174.

11. Capeletti, M., The Judicial Process in Perspective, Chapt. 3, published in 58 Cal L. Rev. 1017(1970), published also in Beatty D., Comparative Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Spring 1994, p. I- 711-8.

12. Where the representative body itself decides on the constitutionality of its laws.

13. Where the Constitution is the basis and the source of all state power.

14. Not by the Parliament itself but either by the regular courts or by a special body, such as the Constitutional Court or some other body.

15. Capeletti, M., The Judicial Process in Perspective, Chapt. 3, published in 58 Cal L. Rev. 1017(1970), published also in Beatty D., Comparative Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Spring 1994, p. I-4/I-II.

16. Poland (1982), already in the former Soviet Union (1988), Romania (1991), Albania (1992), Bulgaria (1991), Lithuania (1992), Estonia (1992), Hungary (first attempt in 1984, definitely in 1989), Slovakia (1992), the Czech Republic (1992), Slovenia (newly established Constitutional Court by the 1991 Constitution), Croatia (1991), after 1991 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Serbia, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, as well as the federal entities of the Russian Federation (Adigea, Altai, Baskiria, Buryatia, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Inguchia, Irkutskaya Oblast, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Khakassia, the Karachaewo-Cherkez Republic, Karelia, Kalmikia, Komy, Marii-El, Northern Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia, Yakutia).

17. Under the Charter of the Tibetans in Exile of 14 June 1991.

18. Although the powers of the House of Lords include some elements of the preventive constitutional review.

19. Concerning the system of the Netherlands, there are a few exceptions concerning the powers of the Supreme Court to decide cases connected to European Communities institutions.

20. However, certain functions of constitutional review may be exercised in Libya by the Supreme Court of Libya which is also a member of the Arab Group of the Constitutional Courts and Constitutional Councils.

21. In the following countries it is not superior in rank, but has a special character of supranational law: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Portugal.

22. In the following countries feature the recognition of the supremacy of supranational law over national law.. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain.

23. Poland (1982), the former Soviet Union (1988), Romania (1991), Albania (1992), Bulgary (1991), Lithuania (1992), Estonia (1992), Hungary (first attempt in 1984, definitely in 1989), Slovakia (1992), the Czech Republic (1992), Slovenia (newly established Constitutional Court by the 1991 Constitution), after 1991: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, The (International) Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY, the FYROM, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro/the FRY, Serbia/the FRY, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (with the Constitutional Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan), as well as the federal entities of the Russian Federation (Adigea, Altai, Bashkiria, Buryatia, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Ingushia, Irkutskaya Oblast, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Khakassia, the Karachaewo-Cherkez Republic, Karelia, Khalmikia, Komy, Marii-El, Northern Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia, Yakutia/Sakha).

24. Such as the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and the State Council of Poland, where the right to petition was held by the general state attorney. Subsequently such constitutional review bodies were also introduced in Romania (the Constitutional Committee by the Constitution of 1965) and in Hungary (by the Constitution of 1984). The Hungarian Council for Constitutional Law was in charge of cooperation with other government bodies concerned with the protection of the constitutionality and legality of all statutes, decrees and ordinances. The 11 to 17 member council was elected by the National Assembly from among the deputies and politicians. The first Constitution of the former Democratic Republic of Germany granted constitutional review jurisdiction to the so-called Constitutional Committee. Before 1963 in Slovenia the system of the protection of constitutionality and legality included the review of rules under the principle of self-review inside the parliamentary system.

25. Based on Kelsen's Model of 1920, involving the interconnection between the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution and the principle of the supremacy of the Parliament, whereunder constitutional matters are dealt with by specialized Constitutional Courts with specially qualified judges or by regular Supreme Courts or High Courts or their special senates (a concentrated constitutional review) in special proceedings (principaliter). Usually abstract reviews are carried out, although specific reviews are also possible. In addition to the a posteriors review, a pri . art . revi . ews are also foreseen. The decisions have an erga omnes effect with reference to the absolute authority of the institution by whom they are issued.

26. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus (as well as statutes and other regulations), Bulgary, Buryatia/Russia, Dagestan/Russia, Estonia (as well as statutes), Georgia, Hungary (as well as statutes), Lithuania, Karelia/Russia, Kazakhstan (as well as statutes), Moldova (as well as constitutional provisions), Romania (as well as statutes and other regulations), Russia (as well as statutes), Tajikistan, Ukraine. The Slovak system on the other hand explicitly excludes the possibility of any preventive review, while the Northern Ossietian system includes the preventative review of statutes and regulations.

27. Preventative reviews by subject and country:
1. Constitutional provisions: Moldova;
2. International agreements: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgary, Buryatia/Russia, Dagestan/Russia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Karelia/Russia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine;
3. Statutes.. Belarus, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Northern Ossetia/Russia, Poland, Romania, Russia;
4. Regulations: Belarus, Northern Ossetia/Russia;
5. Other regulations: Belarus, Romania.

28. Repressive (a posteriors) reviews by type, subject, and country:

1. Abstract reviews:
- Constitutional provisions: Dagestan/Russia, the FRY, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan;
- International agreements: Adigea/Russia, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tatarstan/Russia, Tuva/Russia, Uzbekistan, Yakutia/Russia;
- Statutes: Adigea/Russia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgary, Buryatia/Russia, Croatia, the Czech Republic (as well as the subsidiary power of the Supreme Court), Dagestan/Russia, Estonia, the FRY, the FYROM, Georgia, Hungary, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro/the FRY, Northern Ossetia/Russia, Poland, Russia, Serbia/the FRY, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Tatarstan/Russia, Tuva/Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yakutia/Russia;
- Resolutions of the Parliament: Latvia, Armenia,.
- Regulations: Adigea/Russia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Buryatia/Russia, the Czech Republic, Dagestan/Russia, the FRY, Georgia, Hungary, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro/the FRY, Northern Ossetia/Russia, Poland, Russia, Serbia/the FRY, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Tatarstan/Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yakutia /Russia;
- Acts of the President of the State: Adigea/Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Bulgary, Buryatia/Russia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Northern Ossetia/Russia, Russia, Tajikistan, Tatarstan/Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yakutia/Russia;
- Rules and other acts of national administrative units: Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Buryatia/Russia, Dagestan/Russia, the FRY, Georgia, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Latvia, Northern Ossetia/Russia, Serbia /the FRY, Slovakia, Slovenia, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yakutia/Russia;
- Proclaimed regulatory measures of statutory authorities: Slovenia;
- Other rules: Croatia, the FYROM, Hungary, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Northern Ossetia/Russia, Poland, Serbia/the FRY, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan;
- The conformity of national legal norms with (usually ratified) international agreements: Albania, Bulgary, the Czech Republic, the FRY, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland;
- Regional agreements/agreements of member states concluded with the Federal State: Buryatia/Russia, Dagestan/Russia, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia;

2. Concrete reviews, requested by regular courts: Adigea/Russia, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Bulgary, Buryatia/Russia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Dagestan/Russia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Karelia/Russia, Kazakhstan, Komy/Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Poland (by a request presented by a government body), Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Yakutia/Russia;

3. Interpretation of rules:
- Constitution: Albania, Adigea/Russia, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Bulgary, Buryatia/Russia, Dagestan/Russia, Hungary, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, Kazakhstan, Komy/Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Slovakia, Uzbekistan, Yakutia/Russia;
- Statutes and other rules: Azerbaijan, Dagestan/Russia, Poland, Uzbekistan;

4. Implementation of rules: Bashkiria/Russia, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Russia, Tuva/Russia;

5. Citizens' legislative initiatives: Hungary, Romania;

6. Constitutional Court legislative initiatives: Adigea/Russia, Bashkiria/Russia, Buryatia/Russia, Dagestan/Russia, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Northern Ossetia/Russia, Tatarstan/Russia, Tuva/Russia, Yakutia/Russia.

29. The omission of (statutory) regulations: Hungary.

30. - Between top government bodies: Adigea/Russia, Albania, Azerbaijan, Baskhiria/Russia, Bulgary, Buryatia/Russia, Dagestan/Russia, the FRY, the FYROM, Georgia, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Mongolia, Poland, Russia, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Tatarstan/Russia, Ukraine;
- Between the State and regional or local units: Adigea/Russia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgary, Buryatia/Russia, the Czech Republic (as well as subsidiary power of the Supreme Court), Dagestan/Russia, the FRY, the FYROM, Hungary, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Montenegro/the FRY, Russia, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Tatarstan/Russia, Ukraine,. - Between local or regional units: Bashkiria/Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Buryatia/Russia, the FRY, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Montenegro/the FRY, Russia, Slovenia, Tatarstan/Russia, Ukraine;
- Between courts and other government bodies: Montenegro/the FRY, Serbia/the FRY, Slovenia;
- Other jurisdictional disputes: Croatia, Hungary, Ukraine, Yakutia/Russia;
- Between the Constitutional Courts of the Member states: the FRY.

31. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Bulgary, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the FRY, the FYROM, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro/the FRY, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia/the FRY, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, Slovenia, Yakutia/Russia.

32. Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro/the FRY, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

33. - Elections: Albania, Armenia, Bulgary, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the FRY, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro/the FRY, Romania, Serbia/the FRY, Slovakia;
- Confirming the election of deputies: Bulgary, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine.

34. - Constitutional complaints of individuals: Adigea/Russia, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Buryatia/Russia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Dagestan/Russia, the FRY, the FYROM, Georgia, Hungary, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Montenegro/the FRY, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan;
- (Constitutional) complaints requested by municipalities: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia.

35. The President of the State: Adigea/Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Bulgary, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Yakutia/Russia;
- Other state representatives: Bulgary, Russia, Yakutia/Russia.

36. The President of the State.. Adigea/Russia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Bulgary, Buryatia/Russia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Dagestan/Russia, the FYROM, Georgia, Hungary, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Mongolia, Montenegro/the FRY, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tatarstan/Russia, Ukraine, Yakutia/Russia;
- Other State representatives: Bulgary, Dagestan/Russia, Georgia, Lithuania, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Mongolia, Slovenia, Ukraine.

37. Violations of international law, decisions on matters relating to the appointment of constitutional court judges and their immunities, opinions relating to declarations of martial law, the implementation of decisions issued by international Courts, proposals for the amendment of the Constitution, consultative functions, etc.: Armenia, Bulgary, the Czech Republic, Moldova, Russia, Uzbekistan.
" Azerbaijan, DagestanlRussia, Poland, Uzbekistan.

38. Tasks which the Court is charged with by the Constitution or Statute: Adigea/Russia, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Croatia, Dagestan/Russia, the FYROM, Georgia, Komy/Russia, Montenegro/the FRY, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Tuva/Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

39. e.g. Bulgary, Romania, Uzbekistan.

40. Albania, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Uzbekistan, sometimes even in the form of legislative initiatives by the Constitutional Court (the Member States of the Russian Federation: Adigea, Bashkiria, Buryatia, Dagestan, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Karelia, Komy, Northern Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Yakutia).

41. Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgary, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Slovakia, Uzbekistan, some Member Sates of the Russian Federation (Adigea, Bashkiria, Buryatia, Dagestan, Irkutskaya Oblast, Komy, Yakutia).

42. Azerbaijan, Dagestan/Russia, Poland, Uzbekistan.

43. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Tajikistan.

44. Albania, Azerbaijan, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the FR/Y, the FYROM, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Montenegro/the FRY, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, some Member States of the Russian Federation (Adigea, Bashkiria, Buryatia, Dagestan, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Karelia, Komy).

45. In years: 7 (Slovakia), 8 (Croatia, Poland), 9 (Slovenia, the FYROM, Lithuania, Romania, Hungary), 10 (Ukraine), 11 (Belarus), 12 (Bulgary), 15 (Kyrgyzstan).

46. Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia allow the re-election of (constitutional) court judges.

47. e.g. Albania, Bulgary, Poland, Romania.

48. e.g. Armenia (35), Tajikistan (30), Kyrgyzstan and Georgia (35), Slovenia, Slovakia, Ukraine (40), Hungary (45).

49. e.g. Belarus and in Tajikistan (60) as well as in Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tatarstan/Russia and Hungary (70).

50. In Adigea/Russia, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria/Russia, Buryatia/Russia, Croatia, Dagestan/Russia, Estonia, the FRY, Hungary, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Lithuania, Montenegro/the FRY, Northern Osselia/Russia, Poland, Serbia/the FRY, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Slovenia, Tatarstan/Russia, Tuva/Russia, Uzbekistan and Yakutia/Russia constitutional court judges are exclusively appointed by the legislative body.

51. In Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgary, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Romania and Slovakia.

52. e.g. the FRY, Slovenia, Tuva/Russia, Yakutia/Russia.

53. e.g. Armenia, Bashkiria/Russia, Belarus, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Montenegro/the FRY, Northern Ossetia/Russia, Poland, Serbia/the FRY, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Tatarstan/Russia.

54. e.g. Uzbekistan.

55. e.g. Bulgary, the Czech Republic, Sloveia.

56. e.g. Armenia, Bulgary, Croatia, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine.

57. e.g. the Czech Republic, Georgia, Slovenia.

58. e.g. Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia.

59. Under the Lebanese Constitution of 23 May, 1926, amended on 19 October, 1995, a Constitutional Council was established to review the constitutionality of statutes, and to decide on disputes and protests resulting from presidential and representative elections (Article 19). The right to resort to the Council, with respect to determining the constitutionality of statutes, is enjoyed by the President of the Republic, the President of the Chamber of deputies, and the Prime Minister, or the members of the Chamber of Deputies, and heads of the legally recognized religious groups, with respect to personal affairs, freedom of belief and the exercise of religious rituals, and freedom of religious education.

60. Under the Constitution of 13 March, 1973, the Supreme Constitutional Court is composed of five members, of whom one is the President, and all of whom are appointed by the President of the State by decree (Article 139). It is not permissible to combine membership of the Court with a ministerial post or membership in the Parliament (Article 140). line term of office of Court members is 4 years subject to renewal (Article 141). Court members cannot be dismissed from the Court except in accordance with the provisions of statute (Article 142). The Court determines the validity of the special appeals regarding the election of members of parliament and submits a report on its finding (Article 144). In addition, the Court has the following powers:
- the preventative constitutional review of statutes and legislative decrees before their promulgation (Article 145);
- a consultative function at the request of the President of the Republic (Article 147).
Should the Court decide that a statute or a decree is contrary to the Constitution, whatever is contrary to the text of the Constitution is considered null and void with retroactive effect and has no consequence (Article 145). The Court has no right to look into statutes which the President of the Republic submits to public referendum and are approved by the people (Article 146).

61. The Constitution of Yemen of 28 September, 1994 extended the powers of the Supreme Court of the Republic particularly to cases of:
- charges and counter charges with respect to the unconstitutionality of statutes, regulations and resolutions;
- controversies over jurisdiction among the judicial authorities:
- the impeachment of any of members of the Parliament as may be decided or referred to the Supreme Court by the Parliament;
- the trial of the President of the Republic, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, his deputies, ministers and their deputies in pursuance of statute (Article 151).

62. Under the Constitution of 11 November, 1962, a statute specifies the judicial body competent to decide upon disputes relating to the constitutionality of statutes and regulations and determines its jurisdiction and Proceedings (Article 173). A statute ensures the right of both the Government and the interested parties to challenge the constitutionality of statutes and regulations before the said body. If the said body decides that a statute or a regulation is unconstitutional, it is considered null and void.

63. Under the Constitution (the Basic Statute of the State) of 6 November, 1996, the statute defines the judicial body entrusted with the settlement of disputes pertaining to the extent of the conformity of statutes and regulations with the Basic Statute of the State and that the said statutes and regulations do not contradict its provisions. The statute also specifies the powers of such judicial body and the procedures which it may follow (Article 70).

64. Dahomey - now Benin, Upper Volta now Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sudan.

65. Dahomey - now Benin, Upper Volta now Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, Togo.

66. e.g.: Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Uganda, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swazi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

67. However, the Zambian Constitution of 1991, amended in 1996 established a Special Tribunal empowered to exercise constitutional review.

68. (Article 95); similarly in Ghana and its 1960 and 1969 Constitutions (Article 42 and Article 106 respectively). In Article 2 of the 1969 Constitution it even gave standing to individuals to address the Supreme Court and request constitutional reviews, and pursuant to the modifications of the 1979 Constitution, it explicitly specified that the Supreme Court should have original and exclusive power to carry out constitutional review.

69. Article 84 of the Constitution of Kenya, Article 42 of the Constitution of Nigeria, Para. 4 of Article 30 of the Constitution of Tanzania and Article 29 of the Constitution of Zambia.

70. Republica Cape Verde (Constitution of 7 October, 1980, amended 2 February, 1981, as well as the Constitution of 25 September, 1992), Republica Guinea Bissao (Constitution of 16 May, 1984, as well as the Constitution of 11 May, 1991) and Republica Sao Tome and Principe (Constitution of 5 November, 1975, amended for the last time by Constitutional Statute No. 7190 of October 1990).

71. Articles 90 through 92 of the Constitution of Cape Verde; Article 98 of the Constitution of Guinea Bissao; Article 11 of the Constitution of Sao Tome and Principe.

72. Similar to such bodies established in Laos and in Myanmar.

73. Originally this system was adopted by Mexico (1857), Venezuela (1858), Argentina (Constitutions of 1853, 1860 and 1863), Brazil (1890) and subsequently also by the former British colonies of Central America (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago). Furthermore, it was adopted by some states with little federal experience, such as Colombia (1850), or by a few states irrespective of the form of the state system, such as the Dominican Republic (1844), where this system has been preserved to the present day.

74. e.g. Guatemala (the Constitution of 1965 and the Amparo Act of 3 May, 1966), Honduras (the Constitution of January 1982 and the Amparo Act of 14 April, 1936, amended in February 1982) and Nicaragua (the Constitution of 20 July, 1979), together with the Statute of Rights and Guarantees of 21 August, 1979 and the Amparo Act of 28 May, 1980.

75. Under the Constitution of 30 October, 1987, the Constitutional Court was introduced as a body created by statute which is entrusted with judging the constitutionality of legal rules and measures. The composition, tasks and jurisdiction of this body are regulated by statute (Article 144).

76. e.g. Colombia (the Constitution of 1961; Act No. 96 of 1936 and Decree No. 432 of 1969), Venezuela (the Constitution of 1961; the Supreme Court Act of 30 July, 1976), Panama (the Constitution of 1972, as amended in 1983; the Constitutional Complaint Act of 24 October, 1956), El Salvador (the Constitution of 8 January, 1962,. the Constitutional Proceedings Act of 14 January, 1960), as well as Brazil (the Constitution of 1967, as amended in 1969 and Act No. 4717 of 21 June, 1965); a certain form of popular complaint (actio popularis) exists also in some Argentinean Provinces (Chaco, Neuquen, Santiago del Estero) and Costa Rica (based on the Civil Proceedings Code of 25 January, 1933, as amended on 23 December, 1937).

77. Where the representative body itself decides on the constitutionality of its laws.

78. Whereunder the Constitution is the basis and the source of all state power.

79. Not by the Parliament itself but either by the regular courts or by a special body, such as the Constitutional Court or some other body.

80. See: Pestalozza, C., Verfassungsprozessrecht, Muenchen, C.H. Beck'sche Veriagsbuchhandlung, 1991, p. 372-377.

81. See: Schlaiach, K, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, Muenchen, C.H. Beck'sche Vertagsbuchhandlung, 1994, p. 72.

82. The Constitutional Court Act (Official Gazette SRS, Nos. 39/63 and 1/64) specified the power of and the proceedings before the Constitutional Court; it determined that it should start functioning on 15 February, 1964. The Assembly of the SRS elected the first President and eight judges of the Constitutional Court on 5 June, 1963 (the resolution on their election was published in the Official Gazette SRS, No. 22/63). The President and the judges were sworn in before the President of the Assembly on 15 February, 1964. The first Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court were adopted on 23 February, 1965 (Official Gazette SRS, No. 11/65).

83. In practice, such relations between Constitutional Courts were not easily established, which was also due to inadequate and inaccurate distinctions between the legislative powers of the Federation and the constituent republics, and, in particular, as then believed by the Slovenian Constitutional Court, due to the not very reasonable specification of the powers of the Federal Constitutional Court. The constitutional review in both Autonomous Provinces (Vojvodina, Kosovo), introduced in 1972, existed till 1991, when the jurisdiction of the Serbian Constitutional Court was extended over the whole territory of the constituent Republic of Serbia.

84. See: Srdi Pravna zastita pred Ustavnim sudom, Beograd, Slu beni glasnik, 1993, p. 25.

85. Working Document 1 CDL - 020196 prepared by the Secretariat of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.

86. Full members of the Conference are: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey. The associate members are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldava, Ukraine.

87. http://www.coe.fr

88. Members appointed by the member States of the partial agreement: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Associate members: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia. Observers: Argentina, Canada, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Uruguay, the USA and the Vatican. South Africa has a special cooperative status.

89. Argentina, Canada, Japan, Morocco, Paraguay, South Africa, South Korea and the USA.

90. The Conference as a consultative body includes the following countries:Armenia, Betarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tadjikistan.

91. Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, Palestine, Kuwait, Libanon, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania and Yemen.

92. Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibuti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, France, the FYROM, Gabon, Guinea, Guniea Bissao, Haiti, the Ivory Coast, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Monaco, Morocco, Niger, Poland, Romania, Senegal, the Seychelles, Slovenia, Switzerland, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Zaire.

93. See, in particular, Боботов С.В. Конституционная юстиция. М.,1994,с.55-57.

94. It is perhaps not an accident that following WW II Italy (1948) and Germany (1949) were first to approve the establishment of courts as special institutions of constitutional review, within the framework of the new Constitution.

95. See: Боботов С. А. Указ. работа, с. 62-63; Кряжков В. А., Лазарев Л. В. Конституционная юстиция в Российской Федерации. М., 1998, с. 19-20; Арутюнян Г. Г. Конституционный контроль: характер функционирования и развития системы. М., 1997, с. 39-42.

96. France, Turkey, Turkmenistan, etc.

97. Germany, Spain, Russia, Romania, Poland, Armenia etc.

98. It is quite appropriate to remind that currently in many countries having advanced democratic public relations and attained the greatest heights of civilisation, in Japan before 16 -17^th centuries, in particular, the human rights were used or had a social value only for the elite. The bulk of the population did not even have the right for a name, being called and indicated by their activities or profession. Meanwhile, even Plato thought that a state had to be built so that all together should be happy, rather than only a few. (Платон. “Государство”. Собр. соч., т. 3, М. 1994, c. 189). Of an exclusive significance is the fact that both Plato, and later Aristotle considered the state and society as an indivisible integrity rather than separate entities.

99. As stated by E. Kant, "Only in the society, where there is the greatest freedom, which means a permanent opposition among all its members, with the boundaries of this freedom precisely defined inasmuch as it can be combined with the freedom of others, only in that society the highest design of nature can be materialized, i.e. the development of all natural deposits enclosed in mankind". Кант И. Соч. Т. I. М., 1994, с. 95.

100. In nearly all countries that had legalized the principle of constitutional separation of powers, the Basic Law defines the legal character of the State, directly or indirectly.

101. See: Тихомиров Ю. А. Теория закона. М., 1982, с. 87-103; Тихомиров Ю. А. Публичное право. М., 1995, с. 228-229.

102. The principle of a social state is registered specifically in the Constitutions of Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, as well as Armenia and a number of other countries.

103. It is to be remembered that following WW II, the humanity lived through deep social changes prompted not only by the downfall of Fascism but also by the collapse of the colonial system andformation of the new systems of value in human habitation. Under such conditions, the concept of "a social state" is to be regarded not only as an undertaking to resolve some social issues, but as a radically new quality of public relations cantered at recognising the human dignity and ensuring a new approach to it by the state.

104. Государственное право Германии. М., 1994, с. 64.

105. Мальцев Г. В. Социалистическое право и свобода личности. М., 1968, с. 134.

106. Социальное государство и защита прав человека. М. , АН РФ, 1994, с. 9.

107. As rightly noted by G. V. Maltsev, "...the system of rights and responsibilities is the core, the center of the legal sphere, holding the key to solving the fundamental legal problems ". See.: Мальцев Г. В. Права личности: юридическая норма и социальная действительность. Конституция СССР и правовое положение личности. М., 1979, с. 50.

108. Г. В. Атаманчук. Теория государственного управления. М., Юрид. лит., 1997, c. 353.

109. Хессе Конрад. Основы конституционного права ФРГ. М., 1981, с. 111-112.

110. An interesting problem setting is presented in the study: И. А.Ледях Cоциальное государство и права человека (из опыта западных стран), (See: Социальное государство и права человека. М., АН РФ, 1994, с. 22-33).

111. See: Тихомиров Ю. А. Курс сравнительного правоведения. М.,1996, с.35-41.

112. See: Rupnik, J., Ustavnost, demokracija in politiuni sistem, Zalohba Obzorja Maribor 1975, p. 15-150.

113. In particular, see: Конституционный контроль и демократические процессы в новых независимых странах. Ереван, 1996, с. 222-228.

114. The basic difference between the so-called intervention of the Constitutional Court into the field which belongs to the Legislature, and other forms of intervention by which the Constitutional Court would exceed its authorisation to be sometimes transformed into a reserve Legislature, would be intact that the Constitutional Court abrogating a statute only "takes away", but the Legislature may also amplify. On the other hand, the abrogation of statute by a Constitutional Court decision does not create law to a low degree in comparison with writing new statutorial provisions. It may depend on the context where the abrogated legal provision is situated, on the type of provision, but sometimes only on pure coincidence concerning which legislative technique was used by the Legislature, if the Constitutional Court really executes its supposed undisputable function of negative Legislature, or participates in the creation of a new provision. How much space will belong to the Legislature concerning the extraction of determined unconstitutionalities and how much space lw to be occupied by the Constitutional Court, may in cases ofthe highest degree partially depend also on the intensity of the activities of the Legislature (Testen, F, Techniques of the Decision-Making Process of the Constitutional Court in the Abstract Constitutional Review, Legal Journal (Pravna praksa), No. 1199, p. 5).

115. It is exactly by "interpretation" as a decision-making technique that the Constitutional Court can enter the space which is otherwise reserved for the Legislature. This interpretation entails a technique which is used in Constitutional Court sentences describing the particular contents of a legal norm in an affirmative manner (Testen, F, The Techniques of Constitutional Court Decision-Making Process in the Abstract Constitutional Review, Legal Journal (Pravna praksa), No. 1199, p. 5).

116. See: Конституционное право: Восточно-европейское обозрение,1998, N 2,с.18.

117. Ditto, с. 54.

118. Adigea/Russia, Azerbaijan, Baden-Wuerttemberg/Germany, Bavaria/Germany, Bashkiria/Russia, Belgium, Berlin/Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bremen/Germany, Buryatia/Russia,Croatia, Dagestan/Russia, Estonia, FRY, Germany, Hamburg/Germany, Heessen/Germany, Hungary, Irkutskaya Oblast/Russia, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Montenegro/FRY, Namibia, Niedersachsen/Germany, Nordrhein- Westfalen/Germany, Northern Ossetia/Russia, Poland, Rheinland-Pfalz/Germany, Saarland/Germany, Serbia/FRY, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Tatarstan/Russia, Tuva/Russia, Uzbekistan and Yakutia/Russia.

119. Or not explicitly declared as an independent budget, but a part of the whole State budget, e.g. Article 30 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan Act of 30 August 1995, Article 11.1 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Act of 18 December 1993; Article 39.1 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Yakutia1The Russian Federation Act of 6 February 1992.

120. See also a similar provision in Article 93 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan Act.

121. An indirect form of such power of the Constitutional Court was recognised by the Constitution of 1974 in Articles 410 and 417. Nevertheless, in relation to the Legislature, the former system did not allow the abrogation of statutes or more severe forms of the relationship between the Constitutional Court and the Legislature. Under Article 410 of the Constitution of 1974 the Constitutional Court, however, had a certain 'Preventative function" of integrating current processes of coordination, complementing the further development of the legal system (along with consideration of the principle of the self-restraint of the Constitutional Court), hence the right and obligation to pursue the phenomena important for the implementation of constitutionality and legality, as well as to inform the Parliament of the situation and the problems in the respective domain and to provide it with the opinions and proposals for issuing, modifying or amending of statues, as well as with other measures granting constitutionality and legality. It referred to the phenomena encountered by the Constitutional Court in the cases in which it had already adopted a specific decision, but thereby discovered that in practice the interpretation of the Constitution, the existing statutorial regulations or the implementation of the Constitution or statute may involve certain ambiguities or gaps for which the statute or other legal measures should be modified or amended or replaced by an adequate measure. Under Article 417 of the Constitution of 1974, this applied also to the cases when the Constitutional Court discovered that the competent body had not issued a rule for the implementation of provisions of the Constitution, statute or other rule, although it had been obliged to do so.

122. - Articles 4 and 39 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court (Official Gazette SR, No. 10174)
- Articles 39-41 of the Regulation on Internal Of .face Administration of 26 May and 7 July, 1977 and of 16 January, 1992;
Conclusions on the Assurance of the Public Nature of the Activities of the Constitutional Court through the Public Media of 13 January, 1983 and 24 December, 1987;
- the Legal Information System of the Constitutional Court introduced in 1987 the computerised database of Slovenian Constitutional Case-Law as a public database, in principle accessible to all users of legal information.

123. Article 3 of the Constitutional Court Act; Article 5, Para. 2 of Article 37, Articles 6, 66 and 67 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court; (Official Gazette RS, No. 49/98), Articles 4 through 39 of the Regulation on Internal Office Administration; Conclusions on the Assurance of the Public Nature of the Activities of the Constitutional Court through the Public Media, adopted on 13 January, 1983 and 24 December, 1987.

124. Some Courts have also established additional special services supporting the activities of the Court, e.g. the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan under the Provisions on the Expert Advice Council of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan of 5 July, 1996.

125. Шулъженко Ю. Л. Ор. cit., с. 15-16. Чиркин В. Е. Контрольная власть//Гос. и право. 1993. N4, с. 11-12.

126. Штайнбергер Г. Модели конституционной юрисдикции. Издание Совета Европы, 1994, с.З.

127. Grote R. Das Rechtstaatsprinzip in der mittel- undosteuropaischen Verfassungsgerichtspraxis. /Grundfragen derVerfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Mittel-und Osteuropa. Hrsg. vonJ. A. Frowein und T. Marauhn. Springer, 1998, S.31.

128. See: Бланкенагелъ А. Теория и практика конституционного контроля в ФРГ// Советское государство и право. 1989. N 1, с. 102.

129. Витрук Н.В. Ор. cit., с. 85.

130. For more detail, see: Haberle P. Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit zwischen Politik und Rechtsmssenschaft. Athenaum, 1980, S. 59.

131. See: Баглай М. В. Конституционное право Российской Федерации. М., 1998, с.635.

132. See: Баглай М. В., Габричидзе Б. Н. Конституционное право Российской Федерации. М., 1996, с. 414.

133. Bumpy к Н.В. Ор. cit., с. 85.

134. See: Хабриева Т. Я. Правовая охрана Конституции. Казанский университет. 1995, с. 28-29. Федеральное конституционное право России. М., 1996, с. XI.

135. Конституционный Суд. Сборник постановлений и определений 1995-1996 гг. Кишинэу, 1997, с. 42.

136. See, in particular, Конституционное правосудие в странах СНГ и Балтии. М., 1998, с. 6; Конституции государств Европейского Союза. М., 1997; Кряжков В. А., Лазарев Л. В. Ор. cit., с. 57.

137. ОвсепянЖ. И. Ор. cit., с. 23.

138. To have a rigth to exercise a directing or governing influence over the legislative or executive body.

139. See: Конституции государств Европейского Союза. М., 1997, с. 670.

140. See: Конституционный Суд Российской Федерации. Зарубежная практика конституционного контроля, 1998, вып. 24, с. 7.

141. See, Конституции государств Европейского Союза. М., 1997, с. 708.

142. Ibid, с. 561.

143. See: Конституционный Суд Российской Федерации. Зарубежная практика конституционного контроля. 1998, вып. 25, с.4-7.

144. Овсепян Ж. И. Судебный конституционный контроль в зарубежных странах// Автореф. дис. докт. юрид. наук. М., 1994, с. 10.

145. See: Конституционное правосудие в субъектах Российской Федерации. Под ред. М. А. Митюкова. М., 1997, с. 5.

146. Mopmakoea Т. Г. Разграничение компетенции между Конституционным Судом и другими судами Российской Федерации. //ВКС. 1996, N6, с. 23-24.

147. See, in particular, dissenting opinions by N. V. Vitruk and G. A. Gajiev, Judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on the case "On Interpreting some statements of Articles l25, 126 and 127 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation". « Российская газета», NI2l, от 30.06.1998 .

148. In particular, Боботов С.В. Op. cit., с.64.

149. See: Чиркни В. Е. Конституционное право зарубежных стран. М., 1997, с. 43- 48; Шульженко К. Л. Институт конституционного надзора в Российской Федерации. М., 1998, с.3-7.

150. Шульженко Ю. Л. Ditto, с. 5.

151. See: Альваро Хилъ - Роблес. Парламентский контроль за администрацией /институт омбудсмена/. М., 1997.

152. Adigea/Russia, Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaidjan, Bavaria/Germany, Bashkiria/Russia, Benin, Berlin/Germany, Brazil, Bremen/Germany, Burundi, Buryatia/Russia, Cambodia, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Dagestan/Russia, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, the FRY, the FYROM, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Hessen/Germany, Honduras, Hungary, Israel, Japan, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic/Russia, Karelia/Russia, Komy/Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Montenegro/the FRY, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, RheinlandPfalz/Germany, Russia, Saarland/Germany, Senegal,the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tucuman/Argentina, Ukraine, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela.

153. Those entitled to lodge a constitutional complaint are generally individuals but in Austria, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, the FRY and Montenegro, legal entities are also explicitly entitled, while in the Croatian system legal entities are explicitly excluded as a potential appellant.

154. Adigea, Altai, Baskiria, Buryatia, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Ingushia, Irkutskaya Oblast, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Khakassia, the Karachaewo-Cherkez Republic, Karelia, Kalmikia, Komy, Marii-El, Northern Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia, Yakutia/Sakha.

155. Para. 2 of Article 15 of the Croatian Constitutional Court Act or in Article 39, Article 58 and Para. 4 of Article 61 of the Slovenian Constitutional Court Act.

156. Greece, Italy, Switzerland, the USA.

157. Germany.

158. France is a specific exception among these systems, as private individuals have no access to the Constitutional Council, except with reference to elections. In France, the protection of individual rights is, however, the responsibility of the National Council acting on the basis of a complaint against administrative acts.

159. Australia, Barbados, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, and the USA.

160. "Habeas corpus is mainly used in Argentina (as well as in the following Argentinean provinces.. Chaco, Neuquen and Formosa); Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, the USA, and in Venezuela; in Africa: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swazi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe; in Asia.. Bangladesh, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan.

161. the USA; in Africa: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swazi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; in Asia.. Bangladesh, India, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka.

162. 7he USA, and on the American model, also Taiwan.

163. Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

164. Colombia, Spain.

165. The exceptions are Hungary and Slovenia, where it is restricted by a demonstration of standing by the complainant.

166. Kelsen considers the popular complaint (actio popularis) as the strongest guarantee, however, he does not recommend such solution because of the possible abuse of the right to initiate a dispute as well as because of the risk of the unbearable burdening of the Constitutional Court by such complaints.

167. Bavaria - although in other German provinces and on a federal level there is no popular complaint, Croatia, partly the Czech Republic, the FRY, the FYROM, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malta, Montenegro/the FRY, Slovenia

168. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela.Argentina is an interesting example where there is no popular complaint (actio popularise on afederal level, but individual provinces have introduced it.. Buenos Aires, Chaco, Entre Rios, La Rioja, Nequen, Rio Negro and Santiago del Estero.

169. Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Djibuti, Niger, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone - according to the 1991 Constitution, South Africa and Uganda.

170. Belarus, Belgium, Bulgary, Cambodia, Italy, Latvia.

171. Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Bulgary, Estonia, Italy, Kazahstan, Lithuania, Yakutia.

172. France.

173. Slovenia, Spain.

174. Germany.

175. Ruling No. U-I-71194 of 6 October, 1994, OdlUS III, 109

176. In the form of recurso de agravios, firme de derecho, manifestacion de personas.

177. Incorporated in the institution Reichskammergericht of 1495, envisaged in the famous constitutional text, Paulskirchenverfassung, of 1849, and in Bavaria it was pro vided for in the Constitutions of 1808, 1818, 1919 and 1946.

178. Staatliche Verfassungsbeschwerde.

179. Albania, Andorra, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, the FRY, the FYROM, Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein (1992), Malta, Montenegro/the FRY, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland-Supreme Court, Ukraine.

180. The federal constitutional complaint is the responsibility of the Federal Constitutional Court, the provincial constitutional complaint is the responsibility of certain Provincial Constitutional Courts: Bavaria, Berlin, Hessen and Saarland.

181. Baskiria (under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court), Georgia (under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court), Kyrghyzstan (under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court), Mongolia (under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court since the Constitution of 1992), Papua-New Guinea (under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court), South Korea (under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court since the Constitution of 1987), Taiwan (under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court), Syria (under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court), Uzbekistan (under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court); the Constitutional Courts of Member States of the Russian Federation (Adigea, Buryatia, Dagestan, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Karelia, Komy).

182. Benin (Constitutional Court), Cape Verde (the Supreme Court of Justice), Mauritius (the Supreme Court), Senegal (the Constitutional Council) and Sudan (the Supreme Court).

183. Bavaria, Brazil, Colombia, Croatia, partially the Czech Republic, the FRY, the FYROM, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malta, Montenegro/the FRY, Slovenia.

184. Except for the possibility of indirectly impugning a statute in the FRY, Montenegro/the FRY, Slovenia and Spain, and the direct impugning of a statute in Germany.

185. the FYROM, Slovenia.

186. e.g. the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Spanish Constitutional Court.

187. e.g. in the Czech Republic, Georgia and Slovenia.

188. See also Klucka J., Suitable Rights for Constitutional Complaints, Report on the Workshop on the "Functioning of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia", Riga, Latvia, 3-4 July, 1997, Offprint.

189. In Germany, Hungary, Slovenia and in the Czech Republic municipalities are entitled, in order to protect self-government, to file a "communal" constitutional complaint (Germany recognises the "communal" constitutional complaint on a federal level and on a provincial level in the provinces of Wuerttemberg and North Westphalia). The German system also recognises a special constitutional complaint by an individual in relation to constitutional conditions for the nationalisation of land (Sozialisierung) in the province of Rheinland-Pfalz. A special form of constitutional complaint exists in Spain: there, the institute of the citizens' legislative initiative is also protected by constitutional complaint.

190. In Switzerland and Austria a constitutional complaint can impugn only an administrative act, while in Germany, it can impugn acts of all levels (including a statute) in Spain, Slovenia, the FRY and Montenegro a statute may also be an indirect subject of a constitutional complaint; legislative negligence may be directly impugned by a constitutional complaint in Brazil, and also in the practice of the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Bavarian Constitutional Court.

191. e.g. Article 2 of the Facultative Protocol of the General Assembly of the UN to the International Pact on Citizenship and Political Rights of 19 December, 1966 (Resolution No. 2000 A (XXI)) since the Council for human rights must accept and debate reports from individual persons who claim that they are the victims of the violation of any right defined in this Pact. The right to file an individual complaint is contained in the following: Article 23 of the Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the European Parliament of 12 April, 1989; section 18(2) of the Document of the Moscow Meeting of CSCE of 3 October, 1991; Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November, 1969. Article 28 of the Contract on the European Community of 1 February, 1992; Charter of 1979 of the Comision y la Corte Interamericana de los Derechos Humanos; Statute of 1980 of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights; the

192. Article 25 of the Convention.

193. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms..
- has constitutional status in Austria;
- is the basis for filing an internal national constitutional complaint in Switzerland, where it has a status comparable to the constitutional level,.
In both cases it is permissible to base a national constitutional complaint on the provisions in the Convention.
- it is sometimes higher than ordinary law (Belgium, Cyprus, France, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain);
- it is sometimes ranked as Common Law.. Denmark, which introduced the national use of the Convention by special Statute on I July, 1992, Germany, Finland, Italy, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Turkey;
- it sometimes does not have a direct internal state effect: e.g. Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden. Some countries of Anglophone Africa are an exception regarding the latter group of systems (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda), as they expressly adopted the system for the protection of rights from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (e.g. Nigeria in the Constitution of 1960), influenced by the extension clause to the European Convention in terms of Article 63, which Great Britain signed on 23 October, 1953, whereby only the Convention itself and Protocol I apply in these regions.

194. The status of the Constitutional Court is thus defined in e.g. Para. I of Article I of the Constitutional Court Act of 1994.

195. Ruling issued by the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. U-1-71194 of 6 October, 1994.

196. In Particular, see: Защита основных прав Конституционным Судом. Европейская комиссия “За демократию через право”. Издание Совета Европы, 1995, с. 52-54.

197. See, Юридический вестник, 1997, No1,с. 4.

198. See: Конституционный Суд Российской Федерации. Зарубежная практика конституционного контроля, 1998, вып. 15, с.4-6.

199. See: Бланкенагель А. Детство, отрочество, юность Российского Конституционного Суда. М., 1996, с. 26-28.

200. Article 67. The demands placed upon findings and conclusions.
With regard to issues determined by Points 1 and 2 of Article 100 of the Constitution, a decision shall be adopted based both on the literal meaning of the Act and existing juridical practice.
The Constitutional Court shall adopt findings and conclusions only as to the issues raised in the appeal.
While adopting findings and conclusions, the Constitutional Court shall not be restricted by the reasons and arguments raised in the appeal.
The findings and conclusions of the Constitutional Court shall be made public during the Session and shall be attached to the case file.

201. There is an interesting example of Spain with 29814 cases registered at the Constitutional Court July 15, 1980 – December 31, 1994, of which 28106, or 94.3 percent were by individual complaints (Защита основных прав Конституционным судом. Европейская комиссия "За демократию через право").

202. Г. В. Атаманчук. Теория государственного управления. М., 1997, ст. 369-370.

203. E. g., in Germany, of 5000 complaints annually registered in the Federal Constitutional Court, 98 percent are abrogated, with only 2 percent containing serious issues of constitutionality (See: Общая теория прав человека. М., Норма, 1996, с. 339).

204. e.g. Austria, Armenia, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy.

205. Para. 4 of Article 19 of the Constitutional Court Act.

206. Para. 2 of Article 30 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act. In addition, some Provincial Constitutional Courts adopted the dissenting opinion, e.g. Bavaria (Para. 5 of Article 25 of the Constitutional Court Act; Article 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court), Berlin (Para. 2 of Article 29 of the Constitutional Court Act), Bremen (Para. 3 of Article 13 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court), Hamburg (Para. 4 and 5 of Article 22 of the Constitutional Court Act; Articles 27 and 28 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court), Niedersachsen (Para. 2 of Article 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court).

207. Para. 3 of Article 93 of the Constitution; Articles 35 to 38 of Act No. 184/1975.

208. Article 22 of the Constitutional Court Act.

209. Para. 4 of Article 42 of the Constitutional Court Act No. 28/1982.

210. Para 3. of Article 40 of the Constitutional Court Act; Articles 48 to 50 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court.

211. Para. 2 of Article 31 of the Constitutional Court Act.

212.  Para. 2 of Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act No. 2/1979.

213. Para. 1 of Article 31 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms.

214. Para. 2 of Article 51 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms.

215. Globevnik, Problem obnove v ustavnem sporu, Pravnik, No.. 4-6/82,p. 82.

216. Globevnik, Problem obnove, p. 82.

217. Globevnik, Problem obnove, p. 83.

218. Globevnik, Problem obnove, p. 84.

219. Globevnik, Problem obnove, p. 85.

220. Unwiderruflichkeit, Jochen Abr. Frowein - Thilo Marauhn, Grundfragen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Mittel- und OstEuropa, Cremer, Die Wirkungen verfassungsgerichtlicher Entscheidungen, Springer, Band 130, 1998, p. 249.

221. Jochen Abr. Frowein, Thilo Marauhn, Grundfragen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Springer, Band 130, 1998, p. 249.

222. The individual complaint under Article 25 of the Convention is an extraordinary legal remedy similar to the constitutional complaint (Stackelberg, 87). The Court deals with the case only if all national legal remedies have already been exhausted in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law. Furthermore, the constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (if it is introduced in a particular national legal system), which is the sole subsidiary legal remedy, follows the exhaustion of legal remedies; this is confirmed also by permanent European constitutional case-law) (Stackelberg, 93; Matscher, Der Rechtsmittelbegriff, 266; Nedjati, 16 in 18, Klecatsky, 544; Schmalz, 132). The individual has to exhaust, in a particular case, all legal remedies allowed by the national legal order, including the constitutional complaint (Bleckmann, 45).
Sources:
1. dr. Bleckmann Albert, Staatsrecht II - Die Grundrechte, 3. Auflage, Koeln, 1989, p. 29-46
2. Klecatsky-Oehlinger, Gerichtsbarkeit des oeffentlichen Rechts, Manz Verlag, Wien, 1984, p. 517, 540.
3.Matscher dr. Franz, Der Rechtsmittelbegriff der EMRK, Festschrift fuer Winifried Kralik, Wien, 1968, p. 257
4 Nedjati Zaim M., Human Rights under the European Convention, North-Hollang Publishing Company, Amsterdam-New York-Oxford, 1978, p. 13-20
5.Schmalz Dieter, Grundrechte, 2. Auflage 1991, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden, p. 25-26, 131-133
6.Von Stackelberg Curt Freiherr sen.& jun., Das Verfahren der deutschen Verfassungsbeschwerde und der europaeischen Menschenrechtsbeschwerde, Koeln, 1988, p. 85.

223. e.g. Para. 3 of Article 26 of the Albanian Constitution (No. 7561); Para. 4 of Article VI of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Para. 5 of Article 14 of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court Act; Para. 2 of Article 107 of the Lithuanian Constitution and Article 59 of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court Act; Para. 3 of Article 112 of the Macedonian Constitution; Para. 2 of Article 140 of the Moldavian Constitution; Para. 1 and 4 of Article 82 of the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan; Para. 2 of Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia and Para. 2 of Article 64 of the Armenian Constitutional Court Act.

224. e.g. Article 58 of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court Act.

225. Para. 5 of Article 26 of the Albanian Constitution, No. 7561; Article 61 of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court Act; Article 83 of the Russian Constitutional Court Act and Article 41 of the Belorussian Constitutional Court Act.

226. In addition, it is interesting to note that by the provision of Para 3 of Article 61 of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court has to interpret its own decisions in such way that the contents do not change. The request for such an interpretation is not permissible if the request does not concern the same disputed object, but may lead to the issuing of a new decision (Decision of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court of 21 September 1994, published in the Official Digest, No. 3/1995, 111).

227. Article 42 of the Belorussian Constitutional Court Act; Article 62 of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court Act; Article 68 of the Constitutional Court Act.

228. Article 42 of the Belorussian Constitutional Court Act; Para, 1 of Article 62 of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court Act.

229. Para 2 and 3 of Article 62 of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court Act.

230. Article 68 of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court Act.

231. Para. 2 of Article 127 of the Belorussian Constitution.

232. Articles 105 and 106 of the Lithuanian Constitution and Articles 64 and 74 of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court Act.

233. Para. 3 to 5 of Article 131 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan. In a certain "milder" form a similar "intervention" in a Constitutional Court decision was determined by the former Polish system; similar forms exist in Latvia and Romania, but they are limited to the abstract control of norms.

234. See, в частности, Сборник решений Конституционного Суда Киргизской Республики. Бишкек, 1998, с., 77, 81, 85.

235. See: Федеральный конституционный закон "О Конституционном Суде Российской Федерации". Комментарий. М., 1996, с. 221.

236. See: Овсепян Ж. И. Указ. работа, с. 26-31, 282-306. Шульженко Ю. Л. Конституционный контроль в России. М., 1995, с. 10-11. Боботов С. В. Указ. работа, с. 11-16. Сравнительное конституционное право. М., 1996, с. 231-236. Эбзеев Б. С. Конституция. Правовое государство. Конституционный Суд. М., 1997, с. 162-168 и т. д.

237. See: Конституционное право: Восточно-европейское обозрение, 1996, № 2, с. 2.

238. With this regard, the decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation often contains guidelines to the lawmaker on adopting or amending a specific law, or a statement concerning the right of a state institute having applied the given act, to adjust the relevant issue See.. BKC. 1995, N2-3, c. 49,56,70; N5, c. 18; N6, c. 9, 13, 35-46. 1996, N2, c. 11, 19, 31, 40; N4, c. 9, etc.).

239. Fully dedicated to this issue is the article by Joel Halman "The Constitutions and the Economic Reform in the Transition Period", which invites a very close scrutiny. Конституционное право. Восточно-европейское обозрение, 1996, N⁰2.

240. See: "Конституционный контроль и демократические процессы в новых независимых странах". Сборник материалов Международного семинара. Ереван, 16-18 октября 1996. с. 213.

241. See.: BKC1993, NI, c. 31-32.1995, N2-3, c. 48,59; N4, c. 5-6,- N6, c. 50.1996, N2, C. 47-49; N3, c. 32-33,35; N5, c. 17-18. 1997, N 1, c. 27, 42. 1998, NI, c. 31, 49; N3, c. 38, 74 etc.

242. See: Rupnik, J., Ustavnost, demokracija in politiuni sistem, Zalohba Obzorja Maribor 1975, p. 15-150.

243. "Российская газета" N 96 от 21.05.98 г

244. The lessons of the 1993 conflict in Russia also teach that for the countries of the postcommunist space, the consistent resolutions of these issues are of crucial importance.

245. See: Indicators of Sustainable Development. The Wuppertal Workshop, 15-17 Nov. 1996.

246. The Concept of transition of the Russian Federation to a sustainable development, approved by the ruling of the President of the Russian Federation of April 1, 1996, #440, reads: "One of the basic conditions of the transition to a sustainable development is the insurance of the human and social rights and freedoms. Moving to this objective assumes an establishment of an open society comprising as system elements the legal state, the market economy and the welfare society ". This document gives a practical enumeration of multiple indicators of sustainable development.